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Perceptions of Fair Treatment and Child Support

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This project is motivated by two facts found in previous child support research and data, that many noncustodial parents are not complying with their child support orders (e.g., Grall, 2020; Hodges et al., 2020) and that many noncustodial fathers do not believe the child support agency is “on their side” (e.g., Waller and Plotnick, 2001). These facts may be connected. Perhaps the problem with compliance is not only that noncustodial parents have difficulties being able to pay the amounts required, but also that their attitudes toward the child support agency limit their compliance. If noncustodial parents believed they were being treated fairly by the child support program, compliance with their child support obligations might increase. Indeed, research on the criminal justice system shows that even if individuals do not like the outcome of a judicial process, they are still more likely to comply with court decisions if they feel they were treated fairly in the process (Berman & Gold, 2012). Procedural justice involves careful attention to the process of decision-making, and fair treatment is emphasized. This concept is affecting not only the criminal justice system, but also child support domains.

Indeed, some child support agencies have started exploring procedural justice approaches to see how they could be incorporated into their work, but little is known about whether this will be effective. Previous research using data from the Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration Evaluation (CSPED) has found that satisfaction with the services provided by an agency (“satisfaction” being related, but not identical, to perceptions of procedural justice and fair treatment) can be affected by a suite of enhanced child support services (Cancian et al., 2019b), and that non-Hispanic Black noncustodial parents who are satisfied do pay more support (Meyer and Kim, forthcoming). This finding suggests that changing noncustodial parents’ attitudes toward the child support system may lead to increased

payments (or compliance with child support orders, though this was not tested in the satisfaction research), but little is known on whether attitudes affect child support behaviors.

This report focuses on several related issues. First, we examine whether noncustodial parents believe they were treated fairly in the setting of their child support obligation; whether those who received enhanced child support services (described below) in CSPED report being treated more fairly; and whether various principles of procedural justice can explain perceptions of fair treatment. We also explore whether those who report being treated fairly pay higher amounts of support and comply more with their obligations. A companion paper will describe how noncustodial parents (as well as child support agency staff) conceptualize “fairness” in child support, aspects of policy and practice that they believe to be fair or unfair, and agency practices that would be consistent with a procedural justice approach.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Nonpayment or irregular payment of child support has been a prolonged issue for the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE). The proportion of custodial parents who were owed child support but received nothing has increased over the last 20 years (from 24.7% in 1997 to 30.2% in 2017), and fewer than half of custodial parents receive the full amount of child support ordered (Grall, 2020). Every year, billions of dollars of child support arrearages are generated (\$2.5 billion in Wisconsin alone and \$118 billion nationwide in 2018 (OCSE, 2019)), and most of the unpaid child support is owed by noncustodial parents whose annual earnings are less than \$10,000 (Sorensen et al., 2007). To address the lack of financial reliability of noncustodial parents, a major factor limiting their compliance, OCSE launched CSPED, a random-assignment intervention implemented between 2013–2017 in eight states: California, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin. Enrollment in the

program occurred over the first three years and ended in September 2016 (Cancian et al., 2019b). CSPED programs provided case management, employment assistance, parenting support, and a new approach to child support for noncustodial parents behind in their payments and having employment difficulties. Although most programs allowed participants, once enrolled, to receive services as long as they wanted until the end of the demonstration, participants in the extra services group received most services during their first six months of enrollment (Noyes et al., 2018). The main goal of CSPED was to increase noncustodial parents' ability to pay through child support-led employment programs and to eventually improve the reliability of child support payment to support their children (Cancian et al., 2019b). In Wisconsin, the Department of Children and Families implemented Supporting Parents Supporting Kids (SPSK) in Brown and Kenosha counties as part of CSPED.

Since the primary goal of CSPED was to improve reliable child support payments, the CSPED programs were evaluated on their impacts on several primary child support outcomes including child support compliance rate (the ratio of child support paid to child support owed) and current child support payments and orders. As a whole, CSPED had impacts on lowering the amount of child support orders, which was expected given CSPED's focus on individual-tailored service (e.g., right-sizing orders). CSPED also led to a small decrease in child support payments; although this finding was less robust. CSPED did not improve child support compliance. In Wisconsin, SPSK had no impact on any of the primary outcomes related to child support. While CSPED had little impact on child support payments and compliance, it did substantially improve satisfaction with child support services across all eight states, including Wisconsin. More details can be found in the final CSPED impact report (Cancian et al., 2019b).

CSPED's impacts on satisfaction suggest that it was effective in improving the relationship between noncustodial parents and the agency. What has not yet been examined is whether it also improved the perceived fairness of child support orders, nor whether it can be seen as an intervention that promoted principles of procedural justice.

In the remainder of this section, we turn our attention to prior research on procedural justice. We also summarize literature on if and how perceptions of fairness are associated with future behaviors in the child support system and introduce the Procedural Justice-Informed Alternatives to Contempt (PJAC), a recent demonstration funded by the OCSE, the key principles of which are based on procedural justice and fair treatment.

Procedural Justice

Procedural justice, sometimes known as procedural fairness, emerged as a systematized concept in 1970s when the concept of distributive justice had already been sufficiently developed to set the stage for the study of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988). While distributive justice focuses on *equity*, whether the outcome is allocated proportionately to one's input (Adams, 1963), procedural justice is concerned with the *process* through which the decision is made (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). The notion of procedural justice posits that if people perceive the *process* to be fair, they are likely to comply with the *outcome* (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Huo, 2002), regardless of favorability of the outcome (Berman & Gold, 2012).

The key elements of procedural justice are:

- *Respect,*
- *Individuals' understanding of the process,*
- *Neutrality on the part of decision-makers,*
- *The helpfulness of those in authority, and*

- *Individuals' ability to have a voice in the process* (Swaner et al., 2018; Tyler, 2007).

Therefore, judicial reformers have taken a growing interest in concepts of procedural justice, and there has been growing research on this topic. A previous study suggests that a procedural justice approach did improve later outcomes. For example, a study that compared drug courts with traditional courts revealed that litigants who were in the drug court were less likely to engage in drug relapse and criminal activity than those in the traditional courts (Rossman et al., 2011). The authors concluded that it was not the drug court itself that reduced the levels of drug use and crime, but judicial interaction with defendants (Rossman et al., 2011). Participants in the drug court rated the judge higher than their counterparts in the comparison court on a composite measure of attitude toward the judge that includes whether the judge was knowledgeable about their cases, treated them respectfully, allowed them to tell their side of the story, and more (Rossman et al., 2011). Overall, perceptions of fairness are largely determined by interactions with those in authority, especially the judge in court settings, and it appears to be a key to improve later compliance (Berman & Gold, 2012).

Procedural justice can operate differently for individuals with different characteristics. Although it appeared that the drug court worked well for all participants, those who had antisocial personality disorder showed worse outcomes than average (Rossman et al., 2011). In addition, in studies where there are conflicting interests by gender, gender differences exist. For example, in the case of child custody where mothers mostly get favorable outcomes (e.g., sole physical custody), procedural factors (e.g., whether they were treated respectfully during the processes) matter more for men than for women who more favor distributive factors (e.g., whether they won what they wanted) (Kitzmann & Emery, 1993). Gender differences in perceptions of fairness are also found in the case of child support. Although it does not focus on

procedural justice but rather distributive justice, Lin and McLanahan (2007), using the first wave of Fragile Family and Child Wellbeing survey where respondents answer questions with either yes or no, found that fathers and mothers use different underlying principles to judge the fairness of nonresident fathers' obligations (e.g., orders) and rights (e.g., visitation and decision-making). While fathers prefer equality principles that view obligations and rights independently, mothers prefer equity principles that view obligations and rights as linked (Lin & McLanahan, 2007).

Procedural justice may also vary depending on judicial setting. Researchers argue that in dispute resolution settings, procedural justice is especially salient when outcomes are not what was desired, while it is less salient for disputants who won what they wanted to win (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Still, Kitzmann and Emery (1993) found that parents' satisfaction with the outcome in child custody dispute resolution settings was equally influenced both by procedural factors (e.g., perceived control over decisions and respect) and distributive factors (e.g., outcome favorability). Other aspects of procedural justice such as respect and third-party neutrality are more important in unique situations where disputants have an ongoing relationship such as couples who go through post-divorce or union dissolution procedures (Lind & Tyler, 1988). In sum, perceptions of fairness are influenced by many surrounding factors as well as the quality of direct interactions with the decision-maker.

Procedural Justice in the Child Support System

Procedural justice concepts have been applied to the child support system. Previous research suggests that the five elements of procedural justice are rarely met in the child support system. First, noncustodial parents seldom think that they are treated with respect. Most child support payments (70%) are collected through wage withholding, and some noncustodial parents feel that this does not let them show that they want to support their children, because the process

is automatic (Edin et al., 2019; Turetsky & Waller, 2020). In addition, noncustodial fathers often feel that they are treated as criminals when they fall behind on their child support payments (Edin et al., 2019; Vogel, 2020; Waller & Plotnick, 2001). Second, noncustodial parents often lack knowledge to understand the basics of child support policy (Pate, 2002; Waller & Plotnick, 2001). For example, some noncustodial parents expect to have visitation rights automatically upon the establishment of child support orders (Waller & Plotnick, 2001), when in reality these are separate processes. Third, as in the case of child custody reviewed earlier, fathers often think that the child support system is not neutral but favors mothers (Waller & Plotnick, 2001). Fourth, noncustodial parents often do not think that the child support system is helpful, but rather counterproductive. They encounter a series of enforcement measures when they keep failing to comply with their child support obligations, which eventually reduce nonresident parents' ability to pay (Meyer et al., 2020; Pirog & Ziol-Guest, 2006; Turetsky & Waller, 2020; Vogel, 2020). The consequence in turn may exacerbate the conflicting relationship between noncustodial and custodial parents and the parent-child bond (Edin et al., 2019; Waller & Plotnick, 2001). Finally, their voice is not often heard in court. When appearing in court hearings, noncustodial parents sometimes bring a proof of informal contributions to their children, hoping that their debts will be reduced (Waller & Plotnick, 2001). Because these informal contributions are not recognized, many feel that the child support system is unfair and inflexible. In addition, the child support system ignores relational factors where "package deal" functions that noncustodial parents are less willing to pay child support for children of ex-partners with whom they have little or conflicting relationships (Tach et al., 2010). Indeed, some custodial mothers control noncustodial fathers' access to their children (i.e., gatekeeping) (Classens, 2007), which may lower noncustodial fathers' willingness to support the children. Lastly, noncustodial parents' current

familial responsibility such as having multiple families to support or already supporting coresident children goes unheard (Sullivan, 1992).

Researchers have also investigated the general public's views on the distributive fairness of the amount of child support that should be ordered using vignette techniques (Braver et al., 2015; Coleman et al., 1999; Corbett et al., 1988). While their focus was not specifically on procedural justice, findings on distributive justice provide important implications for noncustodial parents' perceptions of fairness because their satisfaction with the outcome is affected both by procedural and distributive factors (Kitzmann & Emery, 1993). Most participants in one study, both men and women, indicated that a child support amount that they consider fair should be less than state guidelines (Coleman et al., 1999). Findings from these vignette studies commonly highlight that a child support order that is perceived as fair should be responsive to both parents' contextual factors, which are often ignored when setting child support orders. For instance, citizens generally support reducing the amount ordered when a custodial parent remarries or a noncustodial parent's financial status changes (Coleman et al., 1999; Corbett et al., 1988). By contrast, noncustodial parents' voluntary moving to a location far away from the children is considered as a fair reason for increasing the amount ordered (Braver et al., 2015), even though relocation would not affect the amount owed if current policy is followed. Altogether, there is a need for the child support system to improve perceptions of fairness in terms of procedure and distribution, given enough evidence that the child support system is perceived unfair both by noncustodial parents and the public.

Perceptions of Fairness and Child Support Outcomes

Noncustodial parents who do not consider that they are treated fairly may not cooperate with the child support agency. Waller and Plotnick (2001) stated that “[noncustodial] fathers

pursue various unilateral responses to the enforcement of regulations they perceive to be inflexible and unfair” (p.104). Despite this evidence of perceived unfairness in the child support system, limited research has determined the relationship between perceived fairness and subsequent behaviors in child support payments. An important exception, by Lin (2000), found that perceived fairness led to higher compliance of noncustodial fathers with their child support obligations. Another key finding in her study is that although income withholding also has a positive effect on higher compliance, there is little positive effect for those who already think their child support orders are fair. This implies that if more noncustodial parents would perceive their child support order to be fair, the performance of the child support system may improve without additional costs for the use of other enforcement actions.

Approaches to promote perceived fairness in the child support system may be particularly important when parents experience punitive enforcement measures such as a contempt hearing in court. A key effort to incorporate principles of procedural justice for those at risk of contempt hearings is the Procedural Justice-Informed Alternatives to Contempt (PJAC) intervention, a randomized controlled trial developed by the OCSE that has been implemented in five states, starting in 2016. The main goal of PJAC is “to increase reliable child support payments by improving both parents’ perceptions of fairness in the child support program” (Mage et al., 2019, p.2). Specifically, PJAC aims to improve perceptions of fairness, based on the key principles of procedural justice mentioned above, by reducing the occurrence where low-income noncustodial parents are held in contempt of court and are potentially at risk of incarceration. The target population of PJAC is low-income noncustodial parents who are determined to have the ability

to pay.¹ (Cummings, 2020). Using the principles of procedural justice, child support staff aim to build a relationship of trust with both noncustodial and custodial parents, attempt to comprehend each case history, and try to facilitate conferences between the parents that lead to action plans (Kusayeva, 2020). In this way, PJAC provides opportunities for parents to raise their voice in the child support system, to improve parents' understanding of processes, and to demonstrate helpfulness (Treskon & Skemer, 2021). An evaluation of the impact of PJAC on child support compliance is scheduled to be released in 2022.

Taken together, previous studies have revealed that several aspects of the child support system are considered unfair both by noncustodial parents and the general public. Given the important research finding that those who think the system is fair are more likely to comply with child support obligations (Lin, 2000), increasing the number of noncustodial parents who believe their order is fair may be an effective way to increase reliable child support payments. However, the findings from previous studies are limited. First, the samples used in the vignette studies surveying the general public are from a relatively small number of respondents in two states (i.e., Wisconsin and Arizona). In addition, respondents are disproportionately socioeconomically privileged in some studies (Braver et al., 2005). Second, while previous studies used qualitative methods to examine the perceived fairness of child support orders and the child support system in general, there are no larger-scale studies surveying the perceptions of fairness and examining its correlates. Finally, with only a few exceptions, there has been little attention on whether perceived fairness is associated with subsequent behaviors. Although Lin (2000), who was among the first to study the relationship between perceptions of fairness and child support

¹Although it varies by each PJAC agency, in general, the ability to pay is determined based on the receipt of public assistance (e.g., Supplemental Security Income), the status of pending application for public assistance, or the status of incarceration (Cummings, 2020).

payments, provided meaningful findings, the sample used in her study is still small, from a single state, and now dated. Finally, previous studies did not examine whether the relationship between perceived fairness and later child support outcomes may differ across racial and ethnic groups, and recent research (Meyer and Kim, forthcoming) suggests that this might be particularly important. In this report, we begin to fill these gaps by using a larger dataset with two aims: (1) to examine factors associated with perceptions of fairness in the setting of the child support order and (2) to examine whether those who reported greater fairness paid more child support in a later period, and whether the relationship between fairness and payments differs by race and ethnicity.

DATA AND METHODS

Data

The primary data for this report are taken from the follow-up surveys of Wisconsin's SPSK program, taken about one year after each noncustodial parent entered SPSK. We also use data from equivalent programs in six other states (California, Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, South Carolina, and Tennessee),² all of which were part of the CSPED program. We use data from both those randomly assigned to the CSPED extra-services group (who received the intervention) and to the regular-services group (who did not). Along with the follow-up survey data, we also use the SPSK and CSPED baseline surveys (taken by all noncustodial parents at their entry to the program) and three types of administrative records: (a) state information on child support orders and payment (taken from KIDS in Wisconsin); state information on public benefits (from CARES in Wisconsin), and (c) national records of earnings and employment from the National Directory of New Hires. Our general strategy is to take different types of information from four

²An eighth state, Texas, used a shorter baseline survey than the standard survey implemented in other states, so is not included here.

time points. First, we consider the point of entry to SPSK/CSPED, and we take demographic information from the baseline survey (taken at entry). Second, we examine the year after entry, using reports in the follow-up survey and in the child support records to provide information about the way noncustodial parents were treated during this period. Third, we take the point of the follow-up survey (about one year after baseline) to identify the noncustodial parent's assessment of fair treatment. Finally, we examine child support payments in the six months following the survey, using administrative records.

The follow-up survey had response rates of 68.1% (Cancian et al., 2019a). We apply survey weights to account for non-response. We use several strategies to deal with missing data: we generally use single imputation to deal with missing data across variables where the proportion of missingness is higher than 1%. We exclude cases that are missing on variables with less than 1% of missingness.³

Measures

Outcomes

The main outcomes of interests are: (a) perceptions of fairness reported by noncustodial parents in the follow-up survey and (b) later child support payments. Our indicator of perceptions of fairness comes from a single question in the follow-up survey:

“For ... the following statements, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree: Since [random assignment date] the child support program has treated me fairly when setting my child support order[s].”

³The rule of 1% is applied separately to Wisconsin cases and to the seven-state data. The CSPED impact report shows that alternative weights and alternative treatment of missing cases did not make a substantive difference to the impacts (Cancian et al., 2019a).

While this single question does not encompass all components of procedural justice, nor all interactions with the child support program, it allows us to measure noncustodial parents' perceptions of fair treatment in the setting of child support orders, a key procedure of the child support system. We construct a binary variable of fair treatment by combining strongly agree and agree to assign 1 and the other responses to 0.

Noncustodial parents' child support payments in the 6 months after the follow-up survey are measured in two ways: the dollar amount of payments and the compliance rate (the amount of payment divided by the amount of orders). These measures reflect current child support (that is, not payments on arrears or back support). We count the 6 months over which payments are measured from the beginning of the first full month after the completion date of the follow-up survey.⁴

Explanatory Variables for Perceptions of Fair Treatment

In our analyses of perceptions of fair treatment, a key variable is whether the noncustodial parent received the extra services (SPSK in Wisconsin) or regular services (business as usual). Because one of the services received by those in the extra services group was assistance in modifying the amount owed, and because they received enhanced child support services, we expect participants in the extra-services group to report higher levels of fair treatment than those in the regular-services group. We also include three types of explanatory variables: those related to the level of child support orders, those related to relationships with the child support agency, and demographic and economic control variables.

⁴We top-code both payments and compliance using a standard procedure that is consistent with the way employed for the impact report of the CSPED (See Cancian et al. (2019a) for more details on the measurement of child support). The amount of payments is top-coded at three standard deviations above the mean across the entire sample. The compliance rate is top-coded at 1. Top-coding payment variables in this way affect fewer than 2% of the observations.

The explanatory variables related to level of child support orders are measured in the year after entry to SPSK/CSPED so as to be prior to the follow-up question on fair treatment. These include:

1. *The amount of child support orders.* This is the dollar amount of current child support owed in the year after entry and is the sum of amounts owed to all custodial parents.
2. *Burdensome order (owed more than 50% of formal earnings).* This binary variable is equal to 1 if the amount of child support orders in the year after entry exceeds half of the noncustodial parent's formal earnings in the year after entry.
3. *Order modifications (increase and decrease).* We use two binary variables, each of which indicates whether the amount of child support owed increased or decreased in the year after entry.

Since our outcome of perceived fairness specifically measures noncustodial parents' perceptions of fair treatment in the setting of child support orders, we expect all these order-related variables to be closely associated with the outcome. We expect lower perceptions of fair treatment as the amount of child support order increases, for those with burdensome orders, and for those whose order changes to increase. On the contrary, we expect higher perceptions of fair treatment for those with downward modifications of their orders. Unfortunately, we have no specific measures of *how* order decisions were made, so we measure only features of the resulting order, rather than the process by which it was made.

The explanatory variables related to parental relationships with child support agencies come from the five key principles of procedural justice. While we do not have measures that precisely fit the key principles of procedural justice, our variables can be seen as proxies for the procedural justice constructs. The principles and their proxy measurements are:

1. *Respect.* We use measures of child support enforcement actions that occurred between entry and the follow-up survey, given previous research suggesting that some noncustodial parents feel wage withholding deprives them of their right to demonstrate that they want to support their children, and that other enforcement measures reflect the program's primary or exclusive interest in them as financial supporters rather than parents who care. We include whether the noncustodial parent experienced wage

withholding, a contempt hearing, a warrant, a lien, or the suspension of their driver's license. We also include license suspension removal as a possible indicator of respect. Due to the lack of data availability, enforcement variables are used only in analyses for Wisconsin. Finally, we also include a history of incarceration because, even if some elements of the criminal justice system have been reformed towards procedural justice concerns, processes during incarceration seem unlikely to be grounded in respect.

2. *Understanding.* This group of variables includes those that may improve the noncustodial parent's understanding of child support policy. Personalized service is a binary variable that indicates whether the noncustodial parent knows who to contact with questions about their child support agreement (measured at the follow-up survey). Service intensity, covering the period between entry and the follow-up survey, reflects the number of hours the noncustodial parent reported receiving services from the child support office during this period.
3. *Neutrality.* Previous research suggests that some noncustodial fathers feel that the agency is biased toward custodial mothers, but there is much less research on noncustodial mothers. As a result, we incorporate the noncustodial parent's sex as a potential indicator of neutrality. A second variable that may indicate neutrality is whether custodial parents associated with the noncustodial parent received TANF in the year after entry. In these cases, some or all of the child support payments go to offset expenditures on public benefits and do not benefit the noncustodial parent's children. Some research suggests that this is seen as a system biased against parents and toward taxpayers. Finally, some noncustodial parents do not believe in the general principle that noncustodial parents should support their children; these parents may believe the child support program is biased against them. We use survey responses to a question about the importance for parents who live apart from their children to support their children financially, measured at the follow-up. Answers are categorized as "not at all, a little, or somewhat," "very," and "extremely."⁵
4. *Helpfulness.* We use binary variables that indicate whether the noncustodial parent reports in the follow-up survey that the child support system has been helpful in three different aspects of their lives: relationship with custodial parents, provision of financial support to child/children, and relationship with child/children. While the relationship variables are not central to the mission of the child support program, they do represent a clear indicator of helpfulness. Hours of service and personalized service, discussed above, may also be related to helpfulness.
5. *Voice.* We do not have variables that reflect whether noncustodial parents tried to present their perspective and felt that they were listened to (the concept of voice). However, we do know from previous research that there are some features of policy in setting orders with which some noncustodial parents disagree, so we incorporate variables as reflecting those for which the noncustodial parent may want to raise their voices, generally

⁵We combined the first three categories due to the small size in these cells.

measured at follow-up.⁶ First, when noncustodial parents have children with more than one partner, child support orders are more complicated and may be seen as unfair. Second, some noncustodial parents feel that they should not have to support children who they do not see or with whom they do not have a relationship. To incorporate this, we include information about the quality of relationship with each child. We use a self-rating on a five-point scale of the relationship with each child (5 for excellent and 1 for poor) and average over all children. A related measure is gatekeeping, which measures the proportion of custodial parents associated with the noncustodial parent who are reported to make it difficult for the parent to see the child. Third, some parents see their financial support of their children as part of a “package deal” and thus related to (or even contingent upon) their relationship with their former partners, but orders are separate from relationship and contact. To incorporate this, we include information about the quality of relationship with each custodial parent, using the same type of scale as used to measure relationship with children. This may reflect (lack of) voice in that the relationship between the parents is irrelevant to how much child support is ordered. Fourth, informal or in-kind support is generally ignored in the setting of orders; we use a binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial parent reported providing informal cash or in-kind support to any child within the last 30 days. Finally, child support systems in the United States generally ignore coresident children in the setting of an order; we use an indicator of whether the noncustodial parent had any coresident children (defined as 16 or more overnights) in the last 30 days.

We expect all variables related to disrespect to be associated with lower perceptions of fair treatment. Knowing whom to contact in the child support office when having questions may increase the noncustodial parent’s understanding of their child support agreements and thus increase their perceptions of fair treatment. Our other measure of understanding, service intensity, may or may not increase the noncustodial parent’s perceptions of fair treatment depending on whether they feel the services help their understanding. We expect all three variables in the neutrality category to be related to lower perceptions of fair treatment if the child support system is seen as being more likely to be gendered or to reflect the interests of taxpayers. All three variables in the helpfulness category are expected to be associated with higher perceptions of fair treatment. For the variables potentially related to voice, we expect lower

⁶The exceptions in this section are multiple-partner fertility, gatekeeping, and coresident children, all of which are measured at baseline.

perceptions of fair treatment for those with multiple-partner fertility, whose relationship with custodial parents is poor, who could not see their children as much as they wanted due to custodial parents' gatekeeping, who provided informal cash or in-kind support and who live with at least one of their biological children.

We also control for demographic and economic characteristics of noncustodial parents, with all except earnings measured at entry:

1. *Age*. The noncustodial parent's age.
2. *Race and ethnicity*. A categorical variable for the noncustodial parent's race and ethnicity (Hispanic; non-Hispanic White; non-Hispanic Black; and non-Hispanic other).
3. *Education*. The noncustodial parent's educational attainment is measured in three categories (less than 12 years; 12 years/GED; and more than 12 years).
4. *Current partnership status*. Partnership status differentiates between those married, previously married, and never married, and for the latter two categories we differentiate between whether they are currently living with a cohabiting partner.
5. *Formal earnings*. A categorical variable measuring the noncustodial parent's average monthly earnings during the year after entry that come from administrative records (none; \$1 to \$400; \$401 to \$800; \$801 to \$1,500; and more than \$1,500). Categorical variables allow for nonlinear relationships.
6. *Depression*. A binary indicator equal to 1 if the noncustodial parent reported major or severe major depression, based on responses to the eight-item Patient Health Questionnaire depression scale (PHQ-8; Kroenke et al., 2009).
7. *Site*. A categorical variable for each county child support agency.⁷

⁷For states outside Wisconsin, we sometimes combined counties within the same state to increase cell sizes.

Explanatory Variables for Child Support Payments

In our modeling of child support payments, we mostly use the same variables used to predict perceptions of fairness:⁸

1. *Fair treatment.* Our key variables are the noncustodial parent’s program assignment (the extra-services group vs. regular-services group) and whether they perceived fair treatment in the setting of their child support orders.
2. *Child support obligations.* We use the dollar amount of child support owed in the 6 months after the follow-up survey to match the time period of payments and compliance; we also include the burdensomeness of orders and order modifications.
3. *Demographic and economic controls.* Variables in this category remain the same as above in the fair treatment model. In addition, we incorporate whether the noncustodial parent had informal earnings at entry. Informal earnings were calculated based on comparison of the administrative record of formal earnings with a survey report of total earnings that include both formal and informal earnings.⁹
4. *Procedural justice principles.* We include the same measures used in Table 2 to proxy for the five principles of procedural justice (respect, understanding, neutrality, helpfulness, and voice).

⁸A common categorization of variables in models of child support payments is to incorporate the amount owed and variables reflecting the ability to pay support, the willingness to pay support, and the enforcement system (as well as controls) (e.g., Bartfeld and Meyer, 2001). The variables we use here could be recategorized to fit this framework; for example, earnings, incarceration, and burdensome orders could be considered among variables indicating the ability to pay, and whether individuals were treated fairly, relationships with children, and whether custodial parents received TANF could be seen as affecting willingness to pay.

⁹In the baseline survey, questions about earnings in the prior 30 days are prefaced by a request that the noncustodial parent “include any regular paid jobs, odd jobs, work done in your own business, ‘under the table’ work, or ‘informal’ work.” Formal earnings are not separately reported by noncustodial parents, and in the administrative records are only reported by quarters, not months. We compare the amount of total self-reported earnings in the last 30 days to the average monthly amount of formal earnings from the administrative records in the same time period.

Table 1: Characteristics of Noncustodial Parents, Wisconsin

	Mean or %	sd
Male	86%	
Age	34	8
Race/ethnicity		
Hispanic	14%	
Non-Hispanic white	50%	
Non-Hispanic black	30%	
Non-Hispanic other or multiracial	7%	
Education		
< 12 years	28%	
12 years or GED	43%	
> 12 years	30%	
Monthly earnings in the calendar year after entry*		
Earnings \$0	17%	
Earnings \$1–400	31%	
Earnings \$401–800	16%	
Earnings \$801–1,500	19%	
Earnings \$1,501 or more	16%	
Marital and cohabitation status		
Married	9%	
Previously married/now cohabiting	10%	
Never married/now cohabiting	18%	
Previously married/not currently cohabiting	22%	
Never married/not currently cohabiting	41%	
Multiple-partner fertility	60%	
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up)	3.59	1.22
Any coresident child	31%	
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up)	2.39	1.03
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping	0.20	0.34
Missing gatekeeping information	1%	
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry*	19%	
Depression at entry	29%	
Ever incarcerated prior to entry	69%	
Missing incarceration information	1%	
CSPED Extra services group	50%	
Treated me fairly when setting my child support order(s) (at follow-up) Binary	65%	
Treated me fairly when setting my child support order(s) (at follow-up)		
Strongly agree	23%	
Agree	43%	
Neither agree nor disagree	7%	
Disagree	15%	
Strongly Disagree	12%	
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry*	52%	
Wage withholding order in year after entry*	86%	

	Mean or %	sd
Contempt hearing in year after entry*	28%	
New warrant issued in year after entry*	4%	
New license suspension in year after entry*	6%	
License suspension removed in year after entry*	9%	
Lien initiated in year after entry*	30%	
Order modifications in year after entry*		
Order decreased	24%	
Order increased	9%	
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up)	79%	
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up)	1.25	3.61
Missing number of hours	1%	
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up)	52%	
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up)	32%	
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up)	43%	
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children		
Not at all/A little/Somewhat	10%	
Very	35%	
Extremely	55%	
Any informal earnings	30%	
Missing any informal earnings information	1%	
Amount owed in the six months after the follow-up survey*	\$1,503	\$1,033
Amount owed in year after entry*	\$3,279	\$2,032
Amount paid in the six months after the follow-up survey*	\$756	\$894
Compliance in the six months after the follow-up survey*	0.53	0.39
Provided any informal support since entry (follow-up)		
No	29%	
Yes	68%	
Missing	3%	
Observations	595	

Note: Figures are weighted to account for non-response.

Variables in which the time period is not denoted are taken from the baseline.

* Variables taken from (or calculated from) administrative records.

Analytic Approach

We first provide descriptive information on noncustodial parents including levels of their perceptions of fair treatment; separately for Wisconsin only (Table 1) and for seven states including Wisconsin (Appendix Table 1). Then, we turn to multivariate logit regression analyses of whether noncustodial parents feel they were treated fairly in the setting of child support order at the follow-up survey; we present marginal effects at means. We take a sequential approach to examine factors that are related to perceptions of fair treatment. First, we explore whether participants of SPSK (the extra-services group for other states) have higher perceptions of fair treatment in Model A (of Table 2), controlling for demographic and economic characteristics. This demonstrates whether participants believe these programs provided higher levels of fair treatment than those who received regular services. In Model B, we add variables that reflect the level of orders to see if the extra services' relationship to perceived fair treatment persists once these factors are controlled. If the variable denoting the extra-services group was statistically significantly related to perceptions of fair treatment in Model A, but no longer significant in Model B, this would suggest that respondents are reporting about the outcome of their order, and it raises the possibility that it was CSPED's modification strategy that led to feelings of fair treatment rather than the other services provided. Finally, in Model C we add to Model A variables related to relationships with the child support agency. This helps us assess whether other experiences with the agency experienced differently by the extra-services and the regular-services groups can account for the difference in perceptions of fair treatment. We also conduct the same set of analyses for seven states.¹⁰

¹⁰Variables used in Table 2 and Appendix Table 2 are the same, except for the use of enforcement action variables. Enforcement measures are not used for seven-state analyses due to the lack of data availability in other states.

Table 2: Factors Associated with Fair Treatment, Wisconsin

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr
CSPED Extra services group	0.126**	(0.040)	0.128**	(0.041)	0.006	(0.045)
<i>Variables related to orders</i>						
Amount owed in year after entry (in \$1,000)			-0.042***	(0.012)		
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry			0.012	(0.076)		
Order modifications in year after entry						
Order decreased			0.015	(0.049)		
Order increased			-0.006	(0.075)		
<i>Variables related to procedural justice principles</i>						
Wage withholding order in year after entry (Respect)					-0.085	(0.086)
Contempt hearing in year after entry (Respect)					-0.051	(0.056)
New warrant issued in year after entry (Respect)					-0.094	(0.114)
New license suspension in year after entry (Respect)					-0.021	(0.098)
License suspension removed in year after entry (Respect)					0.011	(0.082)
Lien initiated in year after entry (Respect)					-0.071	(0.050)
Ever incarcerated prior to entry (Respect)					0.031	(0.052)
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up) (Understanding)					0.345***	(0.058)
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up) (Understanding)					0.008	(0.007)
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry (Neutrality)					-0.051	(0.061)
Male (Neutrality)					-0.014	(0.068)
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children (compared to not at all/a little/somewhat) (Neutrality)						
NCP financial responsibility: Very					-0.026	(0.074)
NCP financial responsibility: Extremely					-0.013	(0.073)
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up) (Helpfulness)					0.194**	(0.070)
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)					0.201***	(0.053)
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)					0.152*	(0.064)
Multiple-partner fertility (Voice)					0.005	(0.055)

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)					0.005	(0.023)
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)					-0.021	(0.026)
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping (Voice)					0.005	(0.073)
Any informal support since entry (Voice)					-0.090	(0.054)
Any coresident child (Voice)					-0.026	(0.056)
Control Variables						
Age	0.007*	(0.003)	0.008**	(0.003)	0.003	(0.003)
Race/ethnicity (compared to non-Hispanic White)						
Hispanic	-0.050	(0.063)	-0.047	(0.063)	-0.050	(0.068)
Non-Hispanic Black	-0.104*	(0.049)	-0.099*	(0.050)	-0.146*	(0.064)
Non-Hispanic Other or multiracial	-0.216*	(0.087)	-0.217*	(0.088)	-0.227*	(0.104)
Marital and cohabitation status (compared to married)						
Prev-Married/Cohabiting	-0.005	(0.100)	0.061	(0.102)	-0.030	(0.114)
Never-Married/Cohabiting	0.075	(0.091)	0.097	(0.093)	0.079	(0.098)
Prev-Married/Not Cohabiting	0.042	(0.087)	0.076	(0.089)	-0.006	(0.099)
Never-Married/Not Cohabiting	0.096	(0.082)	0.109	(0.085)	0.077	(0.092)
Education (compared to < 12 years)						
12 years or GED	-0.059	(0.047)	-0.057	(0.047)	-0.034	(0.055)
>12	-0.174**	(0.055)	-0.163**	(0.056)	-0.046	(0.061)
Monthly earnings (compared to 0)						
\$1–400	0.118	(0.065)	0.132	(0.067)	0.179	(0.100)
\$401–800	0.128	(0.072)	0.148	(0.090)	0.220*	(0.106)
\$801–1,500	0.147*	(0.069)	0.187	(0.101)	0.188	(0.108)
\$1,501 or more	0.172*	(0.072)	0.236*	(0.106)	0.248*	(0.104)
Depression at entry	-0.112*	(0.044)	-0.125**	(0.045)	-0.109*	(0.049)
Brown County (compared to Kenosha)	0.123**	(0.041)	0.115**	(0.042)	0.035	(0.053)
Observations	595		595		595	

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Model also include indicators for missing hours with child support, any informal or in-kind support, gatekeeping, informal earnings, and incarceration.

We then explore the relationship between perceptions of fair treatment and child support payments in the 6 months after the follow-up survey (both as the dollar amount of child support paid and the compliance rate), using ordinary least squares for Wisconsin (presented in Table 3) and for the seven states (presented in Appendix Table 3). We also take a sequential approach in which we first include the indicator variables for being in the extra-services group and reporting fair treatment, the variables reflecting orders, and control variables. In Model B, we add variables that act as a proxy for procedural justice concepts. A comparison of Model A and Model B allows us to explore payments/compliance related to perceptions of fair treatment, and if and how these relationships change once procedural justice proxy variables are incorporated. Finally, to see if the relationship between perceptions of fair treatment and later child support payments differs by race and ethnicity, we conduct the same sets of analyses for each racial and ethnic group (Table 4). Due to the small number of observations in the Hispanic and non-Hispanic other groups, we conduct the subgroup analysis only for two larger groups (non-Hispanic White, and non-Hispanic Black). Equivalent results for seven states can be found in Appendix Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3: Fair Treatment and Later Payments and Compliance, Wisconsin

	Paid, Model A		Paid, Model B		Compliance, Model A		Compliance, Model B	
	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr
CSPED Extra services group	-52.084	(48.330)	-45.448	(51.285)	-0.034	(0.028)	-0.031	(0.029)
Treated me fairly when setting my CS order(s) (at follow-up)	94.695	(52.998)	91.978	(63.259)	0.011	(0.030)	-0.004	(0.036)
<i>Variables related to orders</i>								
Amount owed during the 6 months after the follow-up survey in \$1,000	553.771***	(26.814)	562.824***	(29.049)	-0.057***	(0.015)	-0.057***	(0.016)
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry	-289.195**	(88.266)	-287.717**	(91.556)	-0.105*	(0.050)	-0.094	(0.052)
Order modifications in year after entry								
Order decreased	27.909	(58.506)	16.881	(60.202)	0.101**	(0.033)	0.088*	(0.034)
Order increased	-249.800**	(87.505)	-236.200**	(90.171)	-0.134**	(0.050)	-0.123*	(0.051)
<i>Variables related to procedural justice principles</i>								
Wage withholding order in year after entry (Respect)			32.319	(98.624)			-0.020	(0.056)
Contempt hearing in year after entry (Respect)			-11.720	(64.003)			-0.010	(0.036)
New warrant issued in year after entry (Respect)			-108.913	(128.469)			-0.089	(0.073)
New license suspension in year after entry (Respect)			-46.259	(108.124)			-0.039	(0.061)
License suspension removed in year after entry (Respect)			-49.683	(91.838)			-0.006	(0.052)
Lien initiated in year after entry (Respect)			1.885	(56.536)			0.026	(0.032)
Ever incarcerated prior to entry (Respect)			-40.157	(57.543)			-0.051	(0.033)
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up) (Understanding)			1.159	(69.335)			-0.009	(0.039)
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up) (Understanding)			-1.757	(7.067)			-0.004	(0.004)
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry (Neutrality)			-36.661	(71.240)			-0.005	(0.040)
Male (Neutrality)			14.394	(78.795)			0.034	(0.045)
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children (compared to not at all/a little/somewhat) (Neutrality)								
NCP financial responsibility: Very			30.865	(87.043)			0.052	(0.049)
NCP financial responsibility: Extremely			17.830	(84.101)			0.041	(0.048)

	Paid, Model A		Paid, Model B		Compliance, Model A		Compliance, Model B	
	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up) (Helpfulness)			60.194	(71.416)			0.042	(0.040)
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)			-88.094	(74.573)			0.015	(0.036)
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)			12.173	(62.941)			-0.010	(0.042)
Multiple-partner fertility (Voice)			-124.216*	(60.503)			-0.045	(0.034)
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)			-14.038	(25.627)			-0.013	(0.015)
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)								
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping (Voice)			-125.620	(79.152)			-0.075	(0.045)
Any informal support since entry (Voice)			82.133	(63.119)			0.063	(0.036)
Any coresident child (Voice)			-28.346	(63.859)			-0.020	(0.036)
Control variables								
Age	8.440*	(3.406)	8.946*	(3.683)	0.004*	(0.002)	0.005*	(0.002)
Race/ethnicity (compared to non-Hispanic White)								
Hispanic	49.058	(75.938)	61.252	(79.385)	0.009	(0.043)	0.002	(0.045)
Non-Hispanic Black	-140.301*	(58.447)	-103.135	(67.132)	-0.064	(0.033)	-0.068	(0.038)
Non-Hispanic Other or multiracial	-142.341	(97.643)	-137.414	(101.674)	-0.093	(0.056)	-0.091	(0.058)
Marital and cohabitation status (compared to married)								
Prev-Married/Cohabiting	-95.939	(112.472)	-124.461	(117.683)	-0.046	(0.064)	-0.062	(0.067)
Never-Married/Cohabiting	-153.382	(104.042)	-158.809	(108.388)	-0.076	(0.059)	-0.079	(0.061)
Prev-Married/Not Cohabiting	-119.651	(97.900)	-167.741	(103.838)	-0.067	(0.056)	-0.092	(0.059)
Never-Married/Not Cohabiting	-189.138*	(93.813)	-219.467*	(99.301)	-0.093	(0.054)	-0.105	(0.056)
Education (compared to < 12 years)								
12 years or GED	-25.639	(60.047)	-43.242	(61.578)	-0.010	(0.034)	-0.014	(0.035)
>12	-19.988	(66.807)	-52.398	(70.065)	-0.028	(0.038)	-0.033	(0.040)

	Paid, Model A		Paid, Model B		Compliance, Model A		Compliance, Model B	
	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr
Monthly earnings (compared to 0)								
\$1–400	-64.761	(73.914)	-103.231	(95.106)	-0.064	(0.042)	-0.060	(0.054)
\$401–800	84.936	(101.345)	41.879	(120.458)	0.126*	(0.058)	0.136*	(0.068)
\$801–1,500	179.662	(113.829)	139.413	(131.631)	0.244***	(0.065)	0.251***	(0.075)
\$,1501 or more	387.956**	(126.795)	325.184*	(143.594)	0.336***	(0.072)	0.328***	(0.081)
Any informal earnings since entry	5.237	(53.385)	3.533	(54.814)	0.030	(0.030)	0.029	(0.031)
Depression at entry	-48.237	(53.855)	-50.788	(55.664)	-0.052	(0.031)	-0.050	(0.032)
Brown County (compared to Kenosha)	69.511	(49.993)	72.837	(59.339)	0.037	(0.029)	0.037	(0.034)
Constant	-140.709	(190.056)	6.423	(248.656)	0.514***	(0.108)	0.524***	(0.141)
Observations	595		595		595		595	

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Model also include indicators for missing hours with child support, any informal or in-kind support, gatekeeping, informal earnings, and incarceration.

Table 4: Fair Treatment and Later Payments and Compliance, Race and Ethnic Groups, Wisconsin

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
CSPED Extra services group	-83.684 (66.997)	-72.520 (71.141)	-145.894 (85.950)	-84.593 (103.413)	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.036 (0.041)	-0.081 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.059)
Treated me fairly when setting my CS order(s) (at follow-up)	-26.132 (74.361)	-88.574 (88.092)	275.767** (95.022)	308.898** (115.465)	-0.094* (0.043)	-0.126* (0.051)	0.138* (0.054)	0.139* (0.066)
Observations	304	304	172	172	304	304	172	172

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Models include all control variables from Table 3.

Model B includes variables related to child support orders; Model A does not.

Sample

Our total analysis sample in Wisconsin consists of noncustodial parents from two counties who fully completed the follow-up survey and for whom we had information (or indicators of missingness) ($n = 595$).¹¹ Analyses using the seven CSPED states, including Wisconsin, have a total analysis sample of 3,403.¹²

Table 1 shows characteristics of sample noncustodial parents in Wisconsin ($n=595$). Most of the noncustodial parents were male with an average age of 34 (S.D. = 8 years). Half of the noncustodial parents in the Wisconsin sample identified as non-Hispanic White, followed by non-Hispanic Black (30%) parents. Most respondents were economically disadvantaged with low educational attainment and low earnings, which is consistent with program requirements to have employment hardship (Noyes et al., 2018). Most participants were never married and not cohabiting with a romantic partner (41%), and six in ten noncustodial parents had multi-partnered fertility. Most noncustodial parents reported moderately high-quality relationships with their children (averaging 3.6 across all children on a scale where 3 is good, 4 is very good, and 5 is excellent), and one-third of them lived with at least one of their biological children. However, participants reported somewhat lower-quality relationship with custodial parents (averaging 2.4 on the same 5-point scale), and 1 in 5 reported that custodial parents acted in a manner consistent with gatekeeping behavior. One in five noncustodial parents reported that they had at least one

¹¹The analysis sample excludes the following: 11 parents who partially completed the follow-up survey, 1 parent who is missing dependent variables, 2 parents who reported that they did not have minor children, and 21 parents who have missing data on variables with less than 1% of missingness.

¹²The analysis sample excludes the following: 57 parents who partially completed the follow-up survey, 181 parents who are missing on dependent variables, 42 parents who reported that they did not have minor children, and 196 parents who have missing data on variables with less than 1% of missingness.

custodial parent who received TANF benefits. Twenty-nine percent of respondents indicated symptoms of depression and more than two-thirds had a history of incarceration.

As expected, the sample was equally divided into the extra-services group (SPSK) and the regular-services group. More than one-fifth strongly agreed that they were treated fairly in the setting of child support orders at the follow-up survey, and another 43% agreed with this statement. However, several parents had characteristics that could be related to lower perceptions of fair treatment. More than half the noncustodial parents owed more than half of their earnings. A substantial majority had a wage withholding order (86%), more than one-quarter had a contempt hearing, and nearly one-third had a lien initiated, all in the year after entry. Fewer parents experienced other enforcement measures. On the other hand, several parents had characteristics that could increase their perceptions of fair treatment. Almost one-quarter had their orders decreased, while only about one in ten had them increased in the year after entry. The majority reported knowing someone to contact when they have questions (79%), and they received, on average, about an hour of child support services. More than half the noncustodial parents found the child support system helpful in providing financial support to their children. Also, although it is not the main mission of the child support system, some noncustodial parents found its services helpful in improving relationship with custodial parents (32%) and with their children (43%).

Most parents reported that they thought it is very or extremely important to support children even when living apart from them, except 1 in 10 parents who reported that it is only somewhat, a little, or not at all important. One-third reported having informal earnings at entry. On average, they owed \$250 per month in the 6 months after the follow-up survey, however, they paid about a half of the amount they owed (\$126 per month), with an average compliance

rate of 53%. Although relatively few were paying their formal obligation in full, the majority reported providing informal cash or in-kind support to their child/children (68%).

Appendix Table 1 shows comparable statistics for the seven states. The proportion reporting fair treatment is slightly lower, 61% compared to 65% in Wisconsin. The racial/ethnic composition of the parents differs in the seven-state sample, with more non-Hispanic Blacks (40%, compared to 30% in Wisconsin) and fewer non-Hispanic Whites (37%, compared to 50% in Wisconsin). In most other ways, the Wisconsin sample is quite similar compared to the overall seven-state sample.

RESULTS

Factors Associated with PERCEPTIONS OF Fair Treatment

Table 2 shows the results of a model predicting perceptions of fair treatment among Wisconsin respondents. Model A shows that those in the extra-services group were more likely to report fair treatment than those in the regular-services group, demonstrating that the SPSK (CSPED) approach to child support was well-received by noncustodial parents.

Model B adds variables reflecting the outcome of child support orders (the dollar amount, whether burdensome, and whether modified), to explore whether the reason for those in the extra-services group reporting fair treatment is that their orders were actually lower. While those with higher orders are less likely to report fair treatment, this is not likely the reason those in the extra-services group reported fair treatment, as the extra-services group still reports fairer treatment, even when the order amount is controlled. In Model C we include proxy variables for procedural justice. Once these are controlled, there is no longer a statistically significant difference between the extra-services group and the regular-services group; the previously-found difference is explained by characteristics that are related to the principles of procedural justice,

primarily those we categorize as proxies for understanding (personalized service) and helpfulness.¹³ Those who report that they know who to contact with questions, an aspect that would increase understanding (but may also be related to helpfulness), are much more likely to report fair treatment. The marginal effect is particularly large, suggesting an increase of 35 percentage points in the likelihood of reporting fair treatment (at the mean). Those who reported that the child support program was helpful in their relationships with their custodial parents, with their children, or in providing financial support, are also more likely to report fair treatment. None of the proxy variables for respect, neutrality, or voice, are statistically significant.

Looking at the control variables, older parents were more likely to report fair treatment, although it is not statistically significant once controlling for proxies for procedural justice in Model C. All models also show that non-Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic others/multiracial reported lower fair treatment than non-Hispanic Whites. This may reflect differences in the way different groups are treated, or different understandings of fairness. In general, the education variable shows an inverse relationship with reported fair treatment: those with more education are less likely to report fair treatment, as are those who are depressed, although some coefficients are not statistically significant in Model C. Those with higher earnings are more likely to report fair treatment.

Appendix Table 2 shows comparable results for the seven-state sample. The results are quite similar to the Wisconsin results for Models A and B. That is, those in the extra services group were more likely to report, and this was not explained by order levels. High amounts owed, whether in dollars or compared to earnings, are associated with lower likelihood of

¹³The coefficient on the extra services group is no longer statistically significant if the only addition to Model A is knowing who to contact; similarly it is no longer statistically significant if the only additions to Model A are the three helpfulness variables.

reported fair treatment. A new result is that, in the seven states, those whose orders are more than half their earnings are less likely to report fair treatment.

Model C does show differences from the Wisconsin results. In the Wisconsin sample, those in the extra-services group were no more likely to report fair treatment than those in the regular-services group once the procedural justice variables were added in Model C. Here, while the coefficient on the extra-services group is diminished substantially, those in the extra-services group are still significantly more likely to report fair treatment, even when the proxies for procedural justice are controlled.¹⁴ Moreover, it is not only the understanding and helpfulness variables that are related to reported fair treatment, but also four of the variables that may be related to voice: those with multiple-partner fertility, those with lower-quality relationships with custodial parents, higher-quality relationships with children, and those who provided informal support all report less fair treatment. Contrary to expectations, those who had been incarcerated (proxying for a lack of respect) were more likely to report fair treatment. Finally, consistent with the idea that neutrality is important and that the child support program's reputation may be "anti-male," noncustodial fathers are less likely to report fair treatment than noncustodial mothers. Across all models, control variables generally have similar relationships with fairness as they do in Wisconsin.

Reported Fair Treatment and Other Factors Associated with Payments and Compliance

Table 3 shows the relationship between reported fair treatment (and other variables), the amount paid, and compliance, in the Wisconsin sample.¹⁵ Consistent with the findings of the

¹⁴Similar to the Wisconsin results, knowing who to contact and the helpfulness variables seem to drive the decline in the coefficient.

¹⁵We conducted an analysis that included an interaction between the extra-services group and reported fair treatment, but the coefficients on the interactions were never statistically significant. Our judgement is that

SPSK impact report, there is no significant difference in payments or compliance for those in the extra-services group compared to the regular-services group, across any models. In Models A and B, those who reported fair treatment did not pay or comply more.¹⁶ Payments are higher when orders are higher, but lower when orders are burdensome. Consistent with some other work (Hodges et al., 2020), compliance is lower when orders are higher. Moreover, orders that increase are associated with lower payments and lower compliance, and those that decrease are associated with higher compliance but no higher payments.

The variables reflecting procedural justice are included in Model B. The only variable related to payments is multiple-partner fertility (perhaps reflecting voice), where payments are lower. Considering control variables across models, non-Hispanic Blacks have lower payments than non-Hispanic Whites in Model A, but not significantly so in Model B. Those who have not been married and are not currently cohabiting pay less, all else equal, and those with higher earnings pay more, and especially comply more with their orders.

Appendix Table 3 shows comparable results for the seven-state sample. These results show some differences compared to the Wisconsin results. For example, those in the extra-services group have lower compliance than those in the regular-services group in these models.¹⁷ Those who reported fair treatment have no different payments nor compliance than those without

an uninteracted model is simpler and more straightforward and would facilitate reader comprehension, so that is what is shown

¹⁶The coefficient for fair treatment is marginally related to payments in Model A ($p < .10$), but this does not reach standard levels of statistical significance.

¹⁷The coefficient on the extra-services group does not represent an experimental impact because some of the other variables in the model are measured after random assignment, and thus may have been affected by the extra services. Results from additional analyses we conducted (not shown in this report) show that the coefficient for the extra-services group is not statistically significant when only control variables are included, but when burdensomeness and order modifications, both of which are measured after random assignment, are included, the coefficient on the extra-services group is statistically significant. The findings highlight the CSPED programs' focus on "right-sizing" orders.

fair treatment. Similar to the Wisconsin results, those with higher orders pay more, but comply less, unless their orders are burdensome (more than half their earnings). Decreases in orders are associated with higher compliance, but increases in orders are not associated with compliance. Taken together, these results are broadly consistent with other research: higher orders may result in higher payments, up to a point, but if they are too high compared to earnings, the relationship will not continue to hold. Higher orders are typically associated with lower compliance.

Model B shows results when the variables that are related to procedural justice are added; a few relationships are statistically significant. Respect may be important (as proxied by incarceration). The helpfulness variables are importantly related not only to fair treatment (Table 2; Appendix Table 2) but also to higher payments and compliance. In contrast, noncustodial fathers were less likely to report fair treatment than noncustodial mothers (which may reflect neutrality), but actually paid and complied more, all else being equal. Co-resident children (which may reflect voice) are related to lower payments, though not to fair treatment.

Similar to the Wisconsin results, the control variables show that non-Hispanic Black parents pay and comply less than non-Hispanic White parents, all else equal. Those with higher earnings pay and comply more. Lower payments and compliance are seen for those never married, whether they are currently cohabiting or not.

Race Differences

The results thus far show that non-Hispanic Blacks are less likely to report fair treatment than non-Hispanic Whites, and pay less, all else equal. Previous research suggests that Black parents may have a particularly contentious relationship with the child support agency, for historical reasons, and that changing this relationship may lead to higher payments (Meyer and Kim, forthcoming). In Table 4, we explore the relationship between fair treatment, payments,

and compliance separately for non-Hispanic Black and non-Hispanic White respondents in the Wisconsin sample. Our model includes all variables used in the payments and compliance models in Table 3, but for efficiency Table 4 shows only the coefficients for the extra services group and reported fair treatment, with the full results shown in Appendix 2. The results show no difference in payments or compliance for those in the extra-services and regular-services groups in any model. For non-Hispanic Blacks, reported fair treatment is associated with higher payments (around \$300 over six months, or \$50/month), and higher compliance rates. The same relationship is not seen for non-Hispanic Whites; in fact, perceived fair treatment is associated with lower compliance. We explore potential reasons for these disparate findings in the conclusions.

In Appendix Table 4 (and Appendix 2), we show the same analyses for the seven-state sample. Similar to the Wisconsin sample, there are no differences in payments or compliance for those in the extra services group compared to the regular services group. In contrast to the Wisconsin results, non-Hispanic Blacks with reported fair treatment do not pay significantly more, but their compliance rates are higher in Model A. For non-Hispanic Whites, those with reported fair treatment do not pay differently, though they do comply less in Model B.

CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Limited prior research has focused on whether noncustodial parents think their child support orders are fair or whether perceptions of fairness are related to child support payment behaviors. In this report, we use data from an intervention that entailed a new approach to child support for noncustodial parents behind in their payments and having employment difficulties, SPSK in Wisconsin, which was part of a broader CSPED intervention. These unique data enable

us to examine how often noncustodial parents report their orders are fair, characteristics associated with fairness, and whether fairness is linked to later payments and compliance.

We find that the proportion of noncustodial parents who said that they were treated fairly is moderately high, 65% among the Wisconsin sample (and 61% in seven CSPED states). Those randomly assigned to the extra-services group of SPSK were to receive more personalized service, individualized case management, employment and parenting services, and have their child support orders reviewed, and, if appropriate, modified (typically downward). Our analyses show that those in the extra-services group were indeed more likely to report fair treatment, and this result holds even when we control for the amount of the order and whether it was modified. An analysis of variables related to principles of procedural justice (respect, understanding, neutrality, helpfulness, and voice) showed that only variables related to understanding and helpfulness were related to perceptions of fair treatment among the Wisconsin sample, although in the full sample some variables related to respect, neutrality, and voice were also important.

In our main results, we do not find that those who report fair treatment have higher payments or compliance. However, in the two Wisconsin counties sampled here, non-Hispanic Blacks who report fair treatment do pay more overall and a higher proportion of their order, a relationship not seen for non-Hispanic Whites. These results are only partially supported in other states. Some research suggests that non-Hispanic Blacks have been less likely to perceive fair treatment from child support in the past (Brito et al., 2014), and, indeed, we find that non-Hispanic Blacks are less likely to report fair treatment than non-Hispanic Whites. This research suggests that if fair treatment can be achieved for a historically disadvantaged group, higher payments may follow. These higher payments could then improve the economic status of economically vulnerable children.

This research has several limitations. Data come from noncustodial parents behind in their payments and having employment difficulties in particular counties in seven states, so the generalizability of these findings is not known. Second, the measure of perceived fair treatment comes from a single variable that reflects only one aspect of interactions with child support, so may not represent a robust definition of fair treatment. More focused interviews with noncustodial parents could expand our understanding. Third, while this work has relevance to ongoing discussions about procedural justice, the variables available to us were not designed to reflect the core principles of procedural justice, so the proxies we use for various constructs are incomplete.

A substantial amount of child support research commissioned by the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families uses the quantitative records of the agency to answer a variety of questions about how the program is working. This report complements these by providing information on noncustodial parent perspectives. In general, these noncustodial parents report that they were treated fairly in the setting of their order, with 59% of those in the regular-services group in Wisconsin either strongly agreeing or agreeing that they were treated fairly. Among those who were in the extra-services group, 72% strongly agreed or agreed, so the services received by the SPSK group were effective in increasing perceptions of fair treatment. With these analyses, we cannot answer the particular feature of SPSK that was effective, whether it was the case management (personalized service), the helpfulness of contacts with caseworkers, attempts to review and modify orders, something else, or a combination. However, the results do imply that expansions of SPSK (like those of the SPSK expansion, known as ELEVATE) could provide fairer (and better) services to parents. While data limitations mean we are unable to

assess the utility of basing services on principles of procedural justice, we highlight that the PJAC impact evaluation results may complement this research and provide additional insights.

Our analysis of factors associated with perceived fair treatment in these two Wisconsin counties could have implications for its guidelines. For example, if those with multiple-partner fertility or those with co-resident children reported lower levels of fair treatment, all else equal, that could suggest a review of how the guidelines treat these situations. Neither of these variables are statistically significant, however, so this research taken alone would not suggest particular guideline difficulties.

Although we do not see a relationship between perceived fair treatment and child support outcomes for the sample as a whole, the results from this Wisconsin sample for non-Hispanic Blacks have the potential to be particularly important. Only 52% of non-Hispanic Blacks in the regular-service group report fair treatment, compared to 66% of non-Hispanic Whites in the regular-service group. Non-Hispanic Blacks are the group where fair treatment might have the largest behavioral effects. A review of data on outcomes among non-Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites might be useful to see if there are particular agency actions that have unequal results, even if there is not an intention to be unequal. For example, do there appear to be disproportionate results in the use of the guidelines, by race, in the level of child support orders, or in the likelihood of various enforcement actions being taken? Further research may be useful.

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Appendix 1, Table 1: Characteristics of Noncustodial Parents, Seven States

	mean or %	sd
Male	90%	
Age	35	8
Race/ethnicity		
Hispanic	18%	
Non-Hispanic white	36%	
Non-Hispanic black	40%	
Non-Hispanic other or multiracial	6%	
Education		
< 12 years	23%	
12 years or GED	43%	
> 12 years	33%	
Monthly earnings in the calendar year after entry*		
Earnings \$0	26%	
Earnings \$1–400	22%	
Earnings \$401–800	15%	
Earnings \$801–1,500	18%	
Earnings \$1501 or more	19%	
Marital and cohabitation status		
Married	14%	
Previously married/now cohabiting	10%	
Never married/now cohabiting	14%	
Previously married/not currently cohabiting	26%	
Never married/not currently cohabiting	36%	
Multiple-partner fertility	62%	
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up)	3.66	1.22
Any coresident child	30%	
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up)	2.40	1.04
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping	0.21	0.35
Missing gatekeeping information	1%	
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry*	25%	
Depression at entry	23%	
Ever incarcerated prior to entry	67%	
CSPED Extra services group	50%	
Treated me fairly when setting my child support order(s) (at follow-up)		
Binary	61%	
Treated me fairly when setting my child support order(s) (at follow-up)		
Strongly agree	21%	
Agree	40%	
Neither agree nor disagree	6%	
Disagree	17%	
Strongly Disagree	16%	
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry*	55%	
Order modifications in year after entry*		

	mean or %	sd
Order decreased	25%	
Order increased	10%	
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up)	73%	
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up)	1.23	3.36
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up)	30%	
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up)	49%	
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up)	41%	
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children		
Not at all/A little/Somewhat	10%	
Very	35%	
Extremely	55%	
Any informal earnings	36%	
Amount owed in the six months after the follow-up survey*	\$1,721	\$1,436
Amount owed in year after entry*	\$3,929	\$3,167
Amount paid in the six months after the follow-up survey*	\$808	\$1,014
Compliance in the six months after the follow-up survey*	0.51	0.39
Provided any informal support since entry (follow-up) (%)		
No	28%	
Yes	70%	
Missing	2%	
Observations	3,403	

Note: Figures are weighted to account for non-response.

Variables in which the time period is not denoted are taken from the baseline.

* Variables taken from (or calculated from) administrative records.

Appendix 1, Table 2: Factors Associated with Fair Treatment, Seven States

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr
CSPED Extra services group	0.178***	(0.017)	0.175***	(0.018)	0.073***	(0.020)
<i>Variables related to orders</i>						
Amount owed in year after entry (in \$1,000)			-0.030***	(0.004)		
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry			-0.085**	(0.033)		
Order modifications in year after entry						
Order decreased			0.019	(0.021)		
Order increased			-0.044	(0.033)		
<i>Variables related to procedural justice principles</i>						
Ever incarcerated prior to entry (Respect)					0.047*	(0.021)
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up) (Understanding)					0.336***	(0.023)
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up) (Understanding)					0.000	(0.003)
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry (Neutrality)					-0.006	(0.024)
Male (Neutrality)					-0.103**	(0.033)
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children (compared to not at all/a little/somewhat) (Neutrality)						
NCP financial responsibility: Very					-0.001	(0.033)
NCP financial responsibility: Extremely					0.005	(0.032)
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up) (Helpfulness)					0.232***	(0.030)
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)					0.140***	(0.022)
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)					0.171***	(0.028)
Multiple-partner fertility (Voice)					-0.073**	(0.024)
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)					-0.020*	(0.010)
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)					0.031**	(0.012)
Any informal support since entry (Voice)					-0.070**	(0.024)
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping (Voice)					-0.057	(0.030)
Any coresident child (Voice)					0.022	(0.024)
<i>Control variables</i>						

	Model A		Model B		Model C	
	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr	MargEff	StdErr
Age	0.004***	(0.001)	0.005***	(0.001)	0.003*	(0.001)
Race/ethnicity (compared to non-Hispanic White)						
Hispanic	-0.010	(0.027)	-0.012	(0.028)	-0.004	(0.030)
Non-Hispanic Black	-0.049*	(0.023)	-0.046	(0.024)	-0.063*	(0.028)
Non-Hispanic Other or multiracial	-0.075*	(0.038)	-0.080*	(0.039)	-0.071	(0.043)
Marital and cohabitation status (compared to married)						
Prev-Married/Cohabiting	-0.037	(0.036)	-0.013	(0.037)	-0.050	(0.042)
Never-Married/Cohabiting	-0.013	(0.034)	-0.020	(0.035)	-0.013	(0.039)
Prev-Married/Not Cohabiting	-0.015	(0.029)	-0.002	(0.030)	-0.013	(0.034)
Never-Married/Not Cohabiting	0.017	(0.028)	0.006	(0.029)	0.017	(0.033)
Education (compared to < 12 years)						
12 years or GED	-0.041	(0.022)	-0.045*	(0.022)	-0.004	(0.026)
>12	-0.102***	(0.024)	-0.102***	(0.024)	-0.010	(0.027)
Monthly earnings (compared to 0)						
\$1–400	0.072**	(0.025)	0.062*	(0.025)	0.057*	(0.028)
\$401–800	0.021	(0.029)	-0.020	(0.034)	0.012	(0.033)
\$801–1,500	0.078**	(0.027)	0.014	(0.039)	0.049	(0.031)
\$1,501 or more	0.030	(0.027)	-0.012	(0.044)	0.033	(0.030)
Depression at entry	-0.061**	(0.020)	-0.061**	(0.021)	-0.023	(0.023)
Observations		3,403		3,403		3,403

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Model also include indicators for county and for missing any informal or in-kind support and gatekeeping.

Appendix 1, Table 3: Fair Treatment and Later Payments and Compliance, Seven States

	Paid, Model A		Paid, Model B		Compliance, Model A		Compliance, Model B	
	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr
CSPED Extra services group	-35.724	(25.825)	-37.358	(26.436)	-0.028*	(0.012)	-0.026*	(0.012)
Treated me fairly when setting my CS order(s) (at follow-up)	-0.006	(27.386)	-13.515	(31.530)	0.002	(0.013)	-0.006	(0.015)
<i>Variables related to orders</i>								
Amount owed during the 6 months after the follow-up survey in \$1,000	443.666***	(10.813)	436.087***	(11.022)	-0.043***	(0.005)	-0.045***	(0.005)
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry	-155.984***	(45.460)	-162.029***	(45.258)	-0.133***	(0.021)	-0.133***	(0.021)
Order modifications in year after entry								
Order decreased	39.238	(30.481)	39.991	(30.466)	0.114***	(0.014)	0.115***	(0.014)
Order increased	62.576	(48.197)	71.185	(48.055)	-0.027	(0.022)	-0.023	(0.022)
<i>Variables related to procedural justice principles</i>								
Ever incarcerated prior to entry (Respect)			-140.304***	(28.042)			-0.060***	(0.013)
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up) (Understanding)			24.727	(33.123)			0.015	(0.015)
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up) (Understanding)			0.014	(3.953)			-0.001	(0.002)
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry (Neutrality)			-68.850*	(31.572)			-0.021	(0.015)
Male (Neutrality)			121.183**	(44.275)			0.044*	(0.020)
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children (compared to not at all/a little/somewhat) (Neutrality)								
NCP financial responsibility: Very			8.640	(45.316)			-0.000	(0.021)
NCP financial responsibility: Extremely			18.844	(43.472)			0.013	(0.020)
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up) (Helpfulness)			-5.705	(37.398)			0.006	(0.017)
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)			-62.217	(38.198)			-0.041*	(0.018)
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)			92.470**	(31.638)			0.045**	(0.015)
Multiple-partner fertility (Voice)			-18.382	(31.261)			-0.019	(0.014)
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)			25.218	(13.016)			0.009	(0.006)
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)			-20.497	(14.941)			-0.002	(0.007)

	Paid, Model A		Paid, Model B		Compliance, Model A		Compliance, Model B	
	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr	Coeff	StdErr
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping (Voice)			-37.666	(39.210)			-0.029	(0.018)
Any informal support since entry (Voice)			9.328	(32.135)			0.018	(0.015)
Any coresident child (Voice)			-73.984*	(32.031)			-0.018	(0.015)
Control variables								
Age	3.194	(1.767)	2.782	(1.850)	0.002**	(0.001)	0.002**	(0.001)
Race/ethnicity (compared to non-Hispanic White)								
Hispanic	0.660	(40.616)	-5.201	(40.821)	0.006	(0.019)	0.003	(0.019)
Non-Hispanic Black	-101.614**	(34.094)	-80.153*	(35.837)	-0.040*	(0.016)	-0.035*	(0.016)
Non-Hispanic Other or multiracial	-45.275	(54.964)	-41.334	(54.828)	-0.020	(0.025)	-0.020	(0.025)
Marital and cohabitation status (compared to married)								
Prev-Married/Cohabiting	63.624	(52.843)	66.017	(53.254)	0.009	(0.024)	0.008	(0.025)
Never-Married/Cohabiting	-103.709*	(50.412)	-103.187*	(50.647)	-0.051*	(0.023)	-0.052*	(0.023)
Prev-Married/Not Cohabiting	-71.990	(42.661)	-96.547*	(43.967)	-0.037	(0.020)	-0.045*	(0.020)
Never-Married/Not Cohabiting	-90.983*	(42.081)	-107.407*	(43.827)	-0.055**	(0.019)	-0.059**	(0.020)
Education (compared to < 12 years)								
12 years or GED	-11.986	(33.199)	-21.544	(33.130)	0.015	(0.015)	0.011	(0.015)
>12	42.340	(35.276)	26.970	(35.655)	0.028	(0.016)	0.020	(0.016)
Monthly earnings (compared to 0)								
\$1–400	-22.612	(37.864)	-23.509	(37.671)	-0.020	(0.017)	-0.020	(0.017)
\$401–800	224.136***	(48.972)	200.088***	(48.855)	0.118***	(0.023)	0.110***	(0.022)
\$801–1,500	343.424***	(55.970)	313.580***	(55.918)	0.172***	(0.026)	0.161***	(0.026)
\$1,501 or more	679.276***	(61.849)	628.295***	(61.900)	0.262***	(0.028)	0.242***	(0.028)
Any informal earnings since entry	-6.348	(26.733)	-9.743	(26.926)	0.013	(0.012)	0.010	(0.012)
Depression at entry	-89.122**	(30.114)	-77.749*	(30.354)	-0.047***	(0.014)	-0.040**	(0.014)
Constant	-200.775*	(101.967)	-189.767	(127.768)	0.478***	(0.047)	0.455***	(0.059)
Observations	3,403		3,403		3,403		3,403	

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Model also include indicators for county and for missing any informal or in-kind support and gatekeeping.

Appendix 1, Table 4: Fair Treatment and Later Payments and Compliance, Race and Ethnic Groups, Seven States

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
CSPED Extra services group	-16.541 (39.023)	-18.714 (39.470)	-59.969 (45.853)	-65.463 (47.446)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.031 (0.020)
Treated me fairly when setting my CS order(s) (at follow-up)	-9.441 (42.441)	-51.200 (48.226)	18.358 (47.910)	16.964 (55.327)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.049* (0.024)	0.045* (0.020)	0.037 (0.023)
Observations	1,278	1,278	1,305	1,305	1,278	1,278	1,305	1,305

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Models include all control variables from Appendix 1, Table 3.

Model B includes variables related to child support orders; Model A does not.

Appendix 2, Table 1: Fair Treatment and Later Payments and Compliance, Race and Ethnic Groups, Wisconsin (all coefficients shown)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
CSPED Extra services group	-83.684 (66.997)	-72.520 (71.141)	-145.894 (85.950)	-84.593 (103.413)	-0.047 (0.039)	-0.036 (0.041)	-0.081 (0.049)	-0.057 (0.059)
Treated me fairly when setting my CS order(s) (at follow-up)	-26.132 (74.361)	-88.574 (88.092)	275.767** (95.022)	308.898** (115.465)	-0.094* (0.043)	-0.126* (0.051)	0.138* (0.054)	0.139* (0.066)
<i>Variables related to orders</i>								
Amount owed during the 6 months after the follow-up survey in \$1,000	655.362*** (37.144)	642.194*** (40.312)	413.711*** (46.966)	460.609*** (56.613)	-0.034 (0.022)	-0.047* (0.023)	-0.081** (0.027)	-0.070* (0.032)
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry	-550.445*** (124.668)	-587.460*** (129.973)	-0.329 (153.602)	-69.554 (170.183)	-0.225** (0.073)	-0.251** (0.075)	-0.003 (0.087)	-0.021 (0.097)
Order modifications in year after entry								
Order decreased	-12.189 (81.052)	-85.776 (84.203)	110.470 (100.204)	115.984 (113.478)	0.106* (0.047)	0.065 (0.049)	0.062 (0.057)	0.057 (0.065)
Order increased	-35.508 (133.077)	-25.030 (138.210)	-436.805** (136.358)	-409.085** (149.259)	-0.059 (0.078)	-0.020 (0.080)	-0.208** (0.077)	-0.188* (0.085)
<i>Variables related to procedural justice principles</i>								
Wage withholding order in year after entry (Respect)		98.585 (136.067)		200.827 (172.499)		0.048 (0.079)		-0.123 (0.098)
Contempt hearing in year after entry (Respect)		-98.324 (92.851)		148.134 (116.578)		-0.006 (0.054)		0.053 (0.067)
New warrant issued in year after entry (Respect)		-281.034 (190.387)		20.145 (203.493)		-0.166 (0.110)		-0.059 (0.116)
New license suspension in year after entry (Respect)		-53.958 (184.855)		-13.142 (173.193)		0.086 (0.107)		-0.071 (0.099)
License suspension removed in year after entry (Respect)		-116.639 (147.250)		46.319 (153.469)		-0.039 (0.085)		-0.024 (0.088)
Lien initiated in year after entry (Respect)		152.238 (81.501)		-143.579 (112.150)		0.083 (0.047)		0.039 (0.064)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
Ever incarcerated prior to entry (Respect)		-24.193 (74.224)		-220.505 (132.119)		-0.074 (0.043)		-0.099 (0.075)
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up) (Understanding)		115.240 (99.851)		-168.591 (138.197)		-0.023 (0.058)		-0.013 (0.079)
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up) (Understanding)		-7.323 (9.678)		-1.963 (12.676)		-0.005 (0.006)		-0.009 (0.007)
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry (Neutrality)		-232.769 (125.024)		25.798 (112.311)		-0.153* (0.073)		-0.001 (0.064)
Male (Neutrality)		75.651 (100.186)		-217.890 (244.160)		0.084 (0.058)		0.064 (0.139)
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children (compared to not at all/a little/somewhat) (Neutrality)								
NCP financial responsibility: Very		-150.628 (110.434)		320.647 (232.881)		-0.049 (0.064)		0.205 (0.133)
NCP financial responsibility: Extremely		-94.228 (109.909)		118.209 (220.222)		-0.004 (0.064)		0.124 (0.126)
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up) (Helpfulness)		107.966 (100.254)		-21.667 (128.980)		0.071 (0.058)		0.022 (0.074)
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)		-84.376 (99.406)		-40.475 (152.914)		-0.024 (0.058)		-0.010 (0.087)
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)		-23.337 (88.364)		122.882 (127.802)		0.023 (0.051)		0.070 (0.073)
Multiple-partner fertility (Voice)		-186.349* (85.773)		-61.013 (132.692)		-0.125* (0.050)		0.061 (0.076)
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow- up) (Voice)		10.793 (35.612)		-16.039 (55.999)		-0.001 (0.021)		0.001 (0.032)
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)		-33.125 (40.077)		36.356 (57.480)		0.004 (0.023)		0.001 (0.033)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping (Voice)		-191.713 (102.369)		-225.088 (182.375)		-0.108 (0.059)		-0.080 (0.104)
Any informal support since entry (Voice)		9.396 (87.897)		117.141 (121.209)		0.021 (0.051)		0.088 (0.069)
Any coresident child (Voice)		64.378 (103.159)		-87.113 (110.908)		0.052 (0.060)		-0.044 (0.063)
Control variables								
Age	10.571* (4.817)	11.884* (5.077)	0.874 (5.502)	2.932 (6.465)	0.007* (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)
Marital and cohabitation status (compared to married)								
Prev-Married/Cohabiting	-201.044 (140.860)	-185.641 (146.524)	51.025 (227.518)	-7.063 (267.170)	-0.066 (0.082)	-0.072 (0.085)	0.041 (0.129)	0.025 (0.153)
Never-Married/Cohabiting	-201.457 (141.691)	-195.083 (147.936)	-151.516 (183.885)	-208.889 (216.290)	-0.069 (0.083)	-0.083 (0.086)	-0.109 (0.104)	-0.137 (0.123)
Prev-Married/Not Cohabiting	-214.571 (124.821)	-286.630* (128.117)	-64.206 (184.901)	-232.966 (226.116)	-0.078 (0.073)	-0.117 (0.074)	-0.056 (0.105)	-0.124 (0.129)
Never-Married/Not Cohabiting	-182.621 (121.780)	-192.235 (128.747)	-180.982 (169.785)	-278.839 (211.666)	-0.051 (0.071)	-0.068 (0.075)	-0.168 (0.096)	-0.175 (0.121)
Education (compared to < 12 years)								
12 years or GED	-90.998 (86.153)	-143.423 (90.223)	64.686 (104.719)	73.977 (110.444)	0.028 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.052)	-0.047 (0.059)	-0.051 (0.063)
>12	-97.446 (92.421)	-148.509 (98.687)	12.232 (122.897)	83.358 (133.869)	-0.028 (0.054)	-0.068 (0.057)	-0.060 (0.070)	-0.037 (0.076)
Monthly earnings (compared to 0)								
\$1–400	-92.336 (104.029)	-217.005 (136.642)	-63.893 (123.162)	-252.185 (169.403)	-0.088 (0.061)	-0.161* (0.079)	-0.066 (0.070)	0.016 (0.097)
\$401–800	-215.472 (138.889)	-343.304* (167.095)	563.926** (174.724)	327.222 (227.567)	0.002 (0.081)	-0.068 (0.097)	0.333** (0.099)	0.383** (0.130)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
\$801–1,500	-129.030 (156.533)	-274.613 (182.250)	584.136** (197.865)	346.375 (248.626)	0.125 (0.091)	0.025 (0.106)	0.376** (0.112)	0.428** (0.142)
\$1,501 or more	86.227 (174.714)	-92.968 (199.437)	810.224*** (225.002)	468.191 (268.833)	0.202* (0.102)	0.077 (0.116)	0.523*** (0.128)	0.508** (0.153)
Any informal earnings since entry	8.908 (78.702)	-15.867 (81.424)	100.118 (91.023)	88.677 (101.306)	0.034 (0.046)	0.007 (0.047)	0.096 (0.052)	0.100 (0.058)
Depression at entry	26.525 (73.467)	15.673 (75.667)	-78.423 (98.682)	-7.144 (105.995)	-0.003 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.044)	-0.116* (0.056)	-0.106 (0.061)
Brown County (compared to Kenosha)	92.032 (67.800)	52.767 (81.319)	-15.311 (89.116)	109.030 (109.321)	0.059 (0.040)	0.057 (0.047)	-0.013 (0.051)	0.045 (0.062)
Constant	99.245 (261.808)	436.472 (337.566)	-300.035 (320.680)	-164.089 (557.263)	0.550*** (0.153)	0.709*** (0.196)	0.575** (0.182)	0.340 (0.318)
Observations	304	304	172	172	304	304	172	172

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Models include all control variables from Table 3.

Model B includes variables related to child support orders; Model A does not.

Appendix 2, Table 4: Fair Treatment and Later Payments and Compliance, Race and Ethnic Groups, Seven States (all coefficients shown)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
CSPED Extra services group	-16.541 (39.023)	-18.714 (39.470)	-59.969 (45.853)	-65.463 (47.446)	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.034 (0.019)	-0.031 (0.020)
Treated me fairly when setting my CS order(s) (at follow-up)	-9.441 (42.441)	-51.200 (48.226)	18.358 (47.910)	16.964 (55.327)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.049* (0.024)	0.045* (0.020)	0.037 (0.023)
<i>Variables related to orders</i>								
Amount owed during the 6 months after the follow-up survey in \$1,000	502.359*** (17.588)	489.711*** (18.069)	390.778*** (18.381)	388.318*** (18.890)	-0.038*** (0.009)	-0.045*** (0.009)	-0.040*** (0.008)	-0.038*** (0.008)
Child support order is burdensome in year after entry	-133.204 (69.332)	-128.696 (68.816)	-152.449 (78.551)	-181.432* (78.558)	-0.157*** (0.035)	-0.157*** (0.034)	-0.114*** (0.033)	-0.118*** (0.033)
Order modifications in year after entry								
Order decreased	57.195 (45.319)	46.966 (45.399)	27.220 (56.033)	27.067 (56.125)	0.122*** (0.023)	0.116*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.024)	0.092*** (0.024)
Order increased	113.883 (70.678)	127.261 (70.303)	70.392 (95.069)	74.639 (95.400)	0.006 (0.035)	0.009 (0.035)	-0.055 (0.040)	-0.056 (0.040)
<i>Variables related to procedural justice principles</i>								
Ever incarcerated prior to entry (Respect)		-118.397** (41.669)		-248.518*** (52.387)		-0.064** (0.021)		-0.077*** (0.022)
Know who to contact when have questions (follow-up) (Understanding)		91.905 (51.280)		-53.439 (59.268)		0.032 (0.025)		0.000 (0.025)
Hours with someone from child support (entry to follow-up) (Understanding)		0.797 (6.206)		-1.890 (6.792)		-0.001 (0.003)		-0.001 (0.003)
Any associated custodial parent received TANF benefits in year after entry (Neutrality)		-101.301 (57.897)		-100.003 (51.662)		-0.061* (0.029)		-0.036 (0.022)
Male (Neutrality)		83.466 (55.367)		95.068 (104.057)		0.056* (0.028)		-0.039 (0.044)
For parents who live apart, importance of supporting their children (compared to not at all/a little/somewhat) (Neutrality)								
NCP financial responsibility: Very		26.565 (67.927)		-132.786 (80.924)		-0.025 (0.034)		-0.027 (0.034)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
NCP financial responsibility: Extremely		55.163	-126.239		0.012		-0.021	
		(65.767)	(78.060)		(0.033)		(0.033)	
Helped me have a better relationship with custodial parents (follow-up) (Helpfulness)		-78.800	37.583		-0.011		0.023	
		(57.940)	(65.484)		(0.029)		(0.028)	
Helped me have a better relationship with children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)		-53.166	21.352		-0.032		-0.034	
		(55.808)	(72.705)		(0.028)		(0.031)	
Helped me provide financial support to my children (follow-up) (Helpfulness)		128.746**	17.585		0.056*		0.038	
		(46.800)	(57.382)		(0.023)		(0.024)	
Multiple-partner fertility (Voice)		4.376	-30.507		-0.026		-0.006	
		(45.597)	(60.886)		(0.023)		(0.026)	
Relationship quality with children (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)		34.899	-13.285		0.013		0.004	
		(18.598)	(25.984)		(0.009)		(0.011)	
Relationship quality with custodial parents (avg) (follow-up) (Voice)		8.829	-11.208		0.013		0.006	
		(22.989)	(27.419)		(0.011)		(0.012)	
Proportion of associated custodial parents who do gatekeeping (Voice)		-76.471	-79.268		-0.035		-0.018	
		(54.542)	(80.304)		(0.027)		(0.034)	
Any informal support since entry (Voice)		-84.091	80.390		0.004		0.016	
		(47.230)	(60.012)		(0.023)		(0.025)	
Any coresident child (Voice)		-128.942*	-24.444		-0.050		-0.013	
		(53.534)	(52.613)		(0.027)		(0.022)	
Control variables								
Age	1.870	1.196	2.618	3.019	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(2.687)	(2.786)	(3.071)	(3.304)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Marital and cohabitation status (compared to married)								
Prev-Married/Cohabiting	10.244	8.123	201.631	204.037	-0.012	-0.020	0.064	0.074
	(74.243)	(74.966)	(104.056)	(104.856)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Never-Married/Cohabiting	-95.625	-101.106	-90.363	-74.904	-0.057	-0.067	-0.014	-0.005
	(80.274)	(81.347)	(86.709)	(87.718)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.037)

	Payments				Compliance			
	Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black		Non-Hispanic White		Non-Hispanic Black	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
Prev-Married/Not Cohabiting	-70.760 (62.444)	-109.031 (65.089)	-44.076 (78.581)	-54.084 (80.704)	-0.016 (0.031)	-0.039 (0.032)	-0.001 (0.033)	0.004 (0.034)
Never-Married/Not Cohabiting	-57.941 (65.090)	-77.361 (67.969)	-75.099 (72.641)	-77.921 (75.428)	-0.023 (0.032)	-0.036 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.032)
Education (compared to < 12 years)								
12 years or GED	-2.943 (53.505)	-11.016 (53.684)	-51.793 (58.079)	-62.106 (58.075)	0.042 (0.027)	0.032 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.025)
>12	74.675 (56.306)	58.447 (57.406)	-45.530 (62.468)	-55.106 (63.205)	0.041 (0.028)	0.019 (0.029)	0.012 (0.026)	0.008 (0.027)
Monthly earnings (compared to 0)								
\$1–400	39.182 (56.784)	23.090 (56.755)	-87.501 (67.255)	-94.083 (67.302)	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.041 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.029)
\$401–800	287.496*** (76.357)	241.542** (76.195)	214.683* (84.125)	178.615* (84.432)	0.133*** (0.038)	0.111** (0.038)	0.098** (0.036)	0.093** (0.036)
\$801–1,500	290.888*** (85.485)	254.245** (85.114)	356.815*** (98.424)	326.650*** (98.367)	0.143*** (0.043)	0.125** (0.042)	0.181*** (0.042)	0.174*** (0.042)
\$1,501 or more	699.229*** (95.687)	654.147*** (95.250)	801.400*** (108.387)	727.843*** (109.071)	0.253*** (0.048)	0.225*** (0.047)	0.295*** (0.046)	0.275*** (0.046)
Any informal earnings since entry	15.486 (40.865)	15.496 (41.240)	-25.995 (47.418)	-31.604 (47.605)	0.010 (0.020)	0.004 (0.020)	0.015 (0.020)	0.016 (0.020)
Depression at entry	-45.769 (43.039)	-22.357 (43.383)	-171.383** (56.470)	-167.912** (56.994)	-0.051* (0.021)	-0.036 (0.022)	-0.062** (0.024)	-0.058* (0.024)
Constant	-279.382 (150.832)	-292.381 (190.937)	-254.834 (224.336)	153.704 (285.212)	0.469*** (0.075)	0.466*** (0.095)	0.334*** (0.095)	0.432*** (0.121)
Observations	1,278	1,278	1,305	1,305	1,278	1,278	1,305	1,305

Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Models include all control variables from Appendix 1, Table 3.

Model B includes variables related to child support orders; Model A does not.